Boeing whistleblower shoots himself dead

[shoulders]

Yes, which is why I didn't so much need a long singular debrief on the safety record of the 737-800 but main hit points and context to conclude whether it has been in general, an effective aircraft that has served its purpose and maintained a good safety record.

Seems to me that the answer is still yes to that. This all stemmed from answering the question 'would I fly a Boeing?'

Perhaps a better question should be, what ought I be flying?

[the hum]

I've always avoided Ryanair owing to their scary bare-bones, utilitarian business model, but assumed that despite all that, if you *had* to fly with them, then at least you knew they were flying a fleet of reputable aircraft. The fact that O'Leary is now saying to Boeing "Yes! Give us your shitcans!" is final confirmation I shouldn't go near them in any circumstances.

I haven't looked up Embraer's safety record, but I've had pleasant enough flights on their little E170/190 jets that the likes of KLM fly. Am I being blissfully ignorant?

EDIT: one, non-fatal incident which could be attributed to the manufacturers. Which is good I suppose.

[All Surrogate]

Perhaps a better question should be, what ought I be flying?

Lizards.

[baptist]

Uncorroborated reports that he was filming a podcast with Alec Baldwin.

[Underturd]

Boeing are surely the epitome of too big to fail?

They always bounce back, the clue is in the name

[shiftwork2]

An interesting development given aviation has been sold as the model safety culture for pretty much everywhere else.  We have been through many iterations of it.  The Crew Resource Management concept was big in the early 2000s and as recently as last week the supposed emphasis on 'what's going right' rather than reactive fault fixing was touted as the way forwards.

[buzby]

Re: @buzby I think that information is good to know but would be more useful in context of what the issues are in competing aircraft built around the same time or since and their comparative significance.

If you take the Airbus A320, which the 737-800 and -900 were developed to compete against, I can't think of any structural or mechanical manufacturing defects that have affected them. All it's main problems, especially in the first few years of service, were due to bugs in the fly by wire flight control system, or from crews not being trained to fly it properly, as how the FBW system controlled the aircraft was very much a paradigm shift away from the 'stick and rudder' hand flying method of all previous airliners they would have flown.

The most famous example at the time was the first passenger-carrying flight of the A320 at an air display at Habsheim-Mulhouse in 1988, where the Air France pilot flew it too low and slow along the runway and into a forest off the end of it.

The most well-known example since would be Air France Flight 477 (an A330, which is a long-range widebody airliner but shares the same FBW system) where due to temporary icing of the pitot tubes at high level cruise the crew stalled the aircraft multiple times before crashing into the Atlantic because they did not recognise the situation and follow the training manual procedures for the 'Unreliable Airspeed' conditon (in that event, the FBW system drops back to 'Alternate Law', which means you have to hand-fly the aircraft with none of the FBW protections, which it as it turned out was not included in Air France's training syllabus).

Yes, which is why I didn't so much need a long singular debrief on the safety record of the 737-800 but main hit points and context to conclude whether it has been in general, an effective aircraft that has served its purpose and maintained a good safety record.

Seems to me that the answer is still yes to that. This all stemmed from answering the question 'would I fly a Boeing?'

Perhaps a better question should be, what ought I be flying?

An aircraft's safety record (accidents per flight hour or precentages of hulls lost) is only half the story. As the above Airbus examples illustrate, the vast majority of aircraft accidents are down to pilot or maintenance errors anyway. As @Dr Trouser says, the big difference between Airbus and Boeing is that since the McD-D takeover, Boeing's attitude on the design and manufacturing side is 'doing as little as we can get away with', and whenever serious defects have been discovered after causing fatal accidents (such as the rudder hardovers or the 737 Max MCAS system) their first response is always to deflect and deny, until they are forced into doing something by regulators. That is what I was trying to illustrate with the examples of issues with the 737 I posted, it was not a comment on the 737-800's safety record in particular. When more scrupulous airlines than RyanAir have started cancelling orders for an aircraft, it tells you something about how people inside the industry view the manufacturer. I've not gone into the issues on their military side either (such as the absolute dog's breakfast that is the KC46 tanker programme, and the tactics they used to win the contract after it was initially won by Airbus).

As to what you should be flying on, personally I'd avoid the 787, any of the 737 Max variants, and high-cycle 737-800s, but the latter is pretty much impossible with RyanAir and Jet2 as you can't tell how old the 737-800 you are going to get is until it arrives at the gate (with RyanAir you might end up with a 737 Max too).

[Glebe]

Bloody awful. RIP.

John Oliver did a piece about Boeing recently, quite disturbing.

[badaids]

Not really sure why but Youtube recommended me a vid a while back of some planespotter who goes around taking trips on knackered passenger planes in less well-off parts of the world.

You wonder why? Look at his (lack of) hair.

[hamfist]

I'm flying Aer Lingus next week. Plane full of craics apparently.

[touchingcloth]

part of Boeing's desire to not spend on R&D and continue flogging the 737 horse is that they managed to pull the wool over the FAA's eyes by having any new variants covered by 'grandfather' certification from the original 737.

That would apply if shoulders were flying in the US - did they manage to pull the same wool over the eyes of the CAA, or do they have different doors when flying in Europe?

[buzby]

That would apply if shoulders were flying in the US - did they manage to pull the same wool over the eyes of the CAA, or do they have different doors when flying in Europe?

There is an international agreement between the various national airworthiness certification bodies that if something is certified by one it is acceptable to the rest (with some minor national deviations), as the certification process is supposed to be an international standard. All Boeing's designs are certified by the FAA as they are based in the US, they dont (usually) need to be recertified to operate in Europe. Similarly, Airbus products are certified by EASA (which the UK used to be part of, until Brexit, so now the CAA is back on it's own but we don't manufacture airliners anymore anyway) and don't need to be recertified to operate in the USA.

The lax attitude to Boeing to quality and safety and loss of technical capability of the FAA (by over-reliance of 'self certification' by manufacturers, introduced by the Republicans in 2003 to cut down on red tape) that was exposed by the 737 Max  brought the whole international agreement into question, with various national agencies witholding certification of the 737 Max in their territories until Boeing had satisfied their conditons to prove it was safe (it took an addtional year of work for China to recertify the Max after it had been recertified in the US and Europe, and then another 2 years before they were allowed to enter back into revenue service).

EASA (and latterly the CAA) operate the same 'grandfather rights' for certifications of modifications of existing designs (for instance, the Airbus FBW system developed for the A320 is used across all of their models, and as long as no substantial changes are required when used on a new design, the flight control system aspect will not need to be recertifed).

Boeing was able to exploit the self-certification process with the 737 Max. It differed so much from the original 737 and 737NG it should really have been treated as a new design, but then it would not have passed certification due to the elements that were grandfathered across. Some of the new additions, such as the MCAS system, would not have passed certification either as it had a single point of failure, so they obscured it's function to the FAA and in the training manuals.

[Johnny Yesno]

This is fascinating stuff, buzby. I had no idea and I don't think anyone else was going to tell me. Many thanks.

[touchingcloth]

There is an international agreement between the various national airworthiness certification bodies that if something is certified by one it is acceptable to the rest (with some minor national deviations), as the certification process is supposed to be an international standard. All Boeing's designs are certified by the FAA as they are based in the US, they dont (usually) need to be recertified to operate in Europe. Similarly, Airbus products are certified by EASA (which the UK used to be part of, until Brexit, so now the CAA is back on it's own but we don't manufacture airliners anymore anyway) and don't need to be recertified to operate in the USA.

The lax attitude to Boeing to quality and safety and loss of technical capability of the FAA (by over-reliance of 'self certification' by manufacturers, introduced by the Republicans in 2003 to cut down on red tape) that was exposed by the 737 Max  brought the whole international agreement into question, with various national agencies witholding certification of the 737 Max in their territories until Boeing had satisfied their conditons to prove it was safe (it took an addtional year of work for China to recertify the Max after it had been recertified in the US and Europe, and then another 2 years before they were allowed to enter back into revenue service).

EASA (and latterly the CAA) operate the same 'grandfather rights' for certifications of modifications of existing designs (for instance, the Airbus FBW system developed for the A320 is used across all of their models, and as long as no substantial changes are required when used on a new design, the flight control system aspect will not need to be recertifed).

Boeing was able to exploit the self-certification process with the 737 Max. It differed so much from the original 737 and 737NG it should really have been treated as a new design, but then it would not have passed certification due to the elements that were grandfathered across. Some of the new additions, such as the MCAS system, would not have passed certification either as it had a single point of failure, so they obscured it's function to the FAA and in the training manuals.

So it's a bit like if the Single Market had allowed America's chlorinated chickens in thanks to agreeing that FDA standards were equivalent to the EU's.

Would you actively avoid getting on one of those Boeing planes, or just prefer to travel on an Airbus all else being equal?

This is fascinating stuff, buzby. I had no idea and I don't think anyone else was going to tell me. Many thanks.

Agreed!

[Dr Trouser]

Having been in front of JAA and EASA many many times in my career I can say that without a doubt they are fucking relentless. Certification against these orgs is a hard slog, as it should be. As a DCS for specific ATA chapters on a340 and a320 I am still legally responsible if an a/c crashes due to a document I signed over 15 years ago.

[touchingcloth]

Yeah, I know someone who worked in compliance for a company that imported and sold microlights and gliders, and the documentation they needed to produce for CAA and similar bodies for that was extensive even though the stakes are massively low compared to commercial jets.

Bit of a tangent, but I knew an engineer at Airbus when that plane ditched in the Hudson, and I was speaking with him on the day they had received the data recorders back and he said that for the rest of the day there were groups of engineers wandering around the place asking each other how the hell the pilot had managed to land given how the margin of error on the angle that would have made the plane cartwheel, bellyflop or land was measured in millimetres.

[Zero Gravitas]

what ought I be flying?

Robinson R44s and if possible V-22 Ospreys.

[shoulders]

personally I'd avoid the 787, any of the 737 Max variants, and high-cycle 737-800s, but the latter is pretty much impossible with RyanAir and Jet2 as you can't tell how old the 737-800 you are going to get is until it arrives at the gate (

Airplane safety is basically whats important from a consumer point of view.

I'm sure I will die in a plane crash just so fate can smite me, but I'd still apply the logic that there is little more of a known quantity in aviation than the 737-800 and Ryanair for all its many, many faults has still never had a fatal plane crash since 1984. Besides, I pick a flight that takes me where I'm going, and usually there's one option, you don't get to decide which company provides it.

As you say, there are other links in the chain outside their direct control. I wouldn't like to experience a scary incident that mentally scars or wounds me either. But I don't personally find the argument that a plane should be avoided because of a very low chance outcome when I'm taking other modes of transport with far higher probability of a crash, injury or death all the time. Do I have a limit? Yes, of course.
 

[buzby]

Ryanair for all its many, many faults has still never had a fatal plane crash since 1984.

RyanAir have never had a fatal crash, but they have had many lucky escapes, again mostly due to pilot and maintenance errors (and occasionally manufacturing errors). They are all documented of you feel like looking yourself.

2 instances (in 2007 and 2017) of losing nosewheels on takeoff or landing, both of which were due to cracked axles caused by improper maintenance procedures.

Last month at Charleroi they had another nosegear incident, where the torsion link (the scissor link that stops the suspension strut rotating) had detached causing the nose leg to rotate 90 degrees on touchdown, destroying one of the wheels. The retaining bolt and pin from the torsion link were later found on the runway in Rome where the aircraft had departed from.

In July 2011 FR-1703 suffered a rapid decompression at 30000ft over the Swiss Alps after a replacement Cabin Pressure Controller had been fitted with the shipping plug still in place on the static port (which measures the cabin pressure). This was despite the cabin pressure control system supposedly having dual redundancy.

They have multiple instances of flap sensor failures each year leading to high-speed flapless landings (there were 6 reported instances last year, the most recent being in November).

Of the incidents that were not pilot or maintenance errors, the following stand out:

In April 2011, FR-9503 lost all instruments and electrical systems on takeoff from Stockholm, caused by a short circuit between the main electrical buses finding a bug in the logic of the Generator Control Unit firmware which then took both generators offline.

In July 2018, FR-7312 underwent a rapid decompression at 37000ft due to a 'Single Event Upset' (Boeing terminology for a untracable hardware bug) in the Cabin Pressure Controller opening the cabin air outflow valve. Despite having two CPCs, the error in one was enough to activate the valve (just as in the July 2011 incident), rendering the system redundancy pointless. Boeing said that the probability of the event reoccuring was so small it was not worth trying to find the bug in the CPC.

In October 2018, FR-6606 had a one of it's laser gyroscopes fail over the Bay Of Biscay which started outputting erroneous position data that led to unreliable airspeed, attitude and altitude indications on the LCD instrument panel and caused the autopilot to commence an uncommanded climb and almost stall the aircraft. There were no instructions in the pilot checklists on how to change over the instrument and system data feeds to the second laser gyro, so they had to fly the remainder of the flight to Edinburgh manually using the standby instruments and manual trim, though the yaw damper system was still taking data from the faulty gyro and making uncommanded rudder inputs.

In January 2019 a main gear pivot pin walked out of the strut that rotated on it when retracting the landing gear on takeoff from Frankfurt, causing the strut to pierce the wing. The aircraft was only 4 months old, being one of the last 737-800s delivered. It was determined that the factory had not fitted the castellated retaining nut on the pivot pin, or if it had been present it had not been fitted with the required locking split pin, causing the pivot pin to eventually walk out of the strut. Boeing had to issue an instruction to all customers with 737-800s not old enough to have had their first line check to inspect the pivot pin. The subsequent investigation found this had happened twice before (in 2016 and 2017), but they had been identified by inpections before those aircraft left the factory.

[Blumf]

It was determined that the factory had not fitted the castellated retaining nut

Sounds familiar.

[Mrs Wogans lemon drizzle]

The last great aircraft Boeing made is usually considered to be the 777, which was designed before the McD-D merger.

Known as the "pilot's airplane." Magnificent machine the 777.  Had the pleasure of flying club world on a BA 777-300ER recently.  Some way to travel. 

Wouldn't touch RyanAir with a bargepole.

[touchingcloth]

Known as the "pilot's airplane." Magnificent machine the 777.  Had the pleasure of flying club world on a BA 777-300ER recently.  Some way to travel. 

I've just been reading about these on Wikipedia.

The first ever fatality caused by the plane was in September 2001.

Spoiler alert

September 5th

[close]

[Mrs Wogans lemon drizzle]

I've just been reading about these on Wikipedia.

The first ever fatality caused by the plane was in September 2001.

Spoiler alert

September 5th

[close]

Blimey.  Burned to death.

[MojoJojo]

RyanAir have never had a fatal crash, but they have had many lucky escapes, again mostly due to pilot and maintenance errors (and occasionally manufacturing errors). They are all documented of you feel like looking yourself.

Thanks for the info. Out of curiosity, how does Ryanair compare to other airlines?

[madhair60]

(sweeps buzby's pencil case off his desk)

[touchingcloth]

Boring have just catapulted a load of passengers into the ceiling

50 people were hurt this week when a 787 dropped suddenly during a Latam Airlines flight.

The Wall Street Journal reported that a flight attendant accidentally hit a switch on the pilot's seat, which pushed the pilot into the controls, forcing down the plane's nose.

[PlanktonSideburns]

Lionel Richie unavailable for comment

[Chollis]

50 people were hurt this week

how does this rank in the worst aviation incidents

[Blumf]

a flight attendant accidentally hit a switch on the pilot's seat, which pushed the pilot into the controls, forcing down the plane's nose.

[Johnny Yesno]

Fucking hell!

'If anything happens, it's not suicide': Boeing whistleblower's prediction to family before death: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sA44FFi95PA